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Abstract 
Despite their availability to firms across the world, uptake of global voluntary standards has 
proceeded unevenly across countries over time. In this article, we seek to provide new 
insights into how geography shapes these spatio-temporal variations, focusing on two 
leading examples of codified voluntarism: ISO14001 and the Global Compact (GC). 
Advancing on previous quantitative studies, which have analyzed domestic and non-
domestic influences separately, we examine how the internal attributes of place “condition” 
the influence of transnational spatial interdependencies. We find that higher levels of 
ISO14001 certification in other economies are more likely to spillover (via transnational 
linkages) into higher domestic uptake of the standard in wealthier economies, while 
domestic receptivity to the influence of higher GC adoptions abroad is greater in more 
democratic countries. Another important advance on previous studies is that we examine 
the influence of a larger number of measures of transnational economic linkage. Providing 
evidence of “trading-up” and “investing-up” dynamics, we show that higher densities of 
ISO14001 certificates and GC participants in a country’s export and inward FDI partners is 
associated with higher levels of domestic uptake of the respective standard. We also find 
tentative evidence of “visiting-up” dynamics associated with the cross-border movement of 
businesspeople.  
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Introduction
An important feature of the past two decades has been the growth of voluntary corporate 
responsibility (CR) standards governing the behavior of firms in areas such as 
environmental sustainability, labor rights and corruption (Angel et al., 2007; 
Christopherson and Lillie, 2005; Hughes et al., 2007; Klooster, 2006; Nadvi, 2008). 
Arguably the most prominent amongst these expressions of corporate voluntarism have 
been “global” standards, such as the Global Compact (GC), ISO14001, Responsible Care 
and SA9000. Although so-called because they can be implemented by firms all over the 
world, a common feature of global standards has been geographic unevenness in their 
uptake (Bennie et al., 2007; Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Neumayer and Perkins, 2004; 
Stringer, 2006). 
Understanding variations in the uptake of CR standards – both across time and 
space – has spawned a quantitative research literature, which has sought to explain 
geographic unevenness in terms of spatio-temporal diffusion processes (Albuquerque et al., 
2007; Corbett and Kirsch, 2001; Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Neumayer and Perkins, 2004; 
Potoski and Prakash, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006, 2007). Our large-N, econometric 
contribution in the present article advances on this previous work in three important areas. 
First, we attempt to provide a more realistic test of how transnational flows of information, 
norms and pressures influence the domestic uptake of CR standards. Unique to the 
literature, therefore, our study uses an interactive model specification whereby the 
influence of standard adoption in other states working through transnational linkages is 
“conditioned” by domestic contextual factors of wealth and democracy.  
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A second contribution is that we analyze three measures of transnational economic 
linkages through which global standards might plausibly “spillover” (i.e. diffuse) from one 
country to another. These are exports and inward foreign direct investment (FDI), both of 
which have featured in previous studies, and international business travel, which has not. 
Importantly, we go beyond a number of previous studies, which have relied on aggregate 
measures of total transnational linkages. Instead, we make use of bilateral data to construct 
spatial lag variables, which capture the density of standard adoption in foreign countries 
weighted by the degree of connectivity to other states (Corbett and Kirsch, 2001; Delmas 
and Montiel, 2008; Moon and deLeon, 2005; Neumayer and Perkins, 2004). 
A third advance is to examine two global standards with very different 
characteristics: ISO14001 and the GC. The GC has only been the subject of a single study 
which, rather than examining spatio-temporal variations across countries, focuses on 
uneven participation amongst Forbes Global 2000 list companies (Bennie et al., 2007). 
Through the use of a common methodology, we provide new insights into whether cross-
national disparities in the uptake of standards with very different characteristics – ISO 
14001 and the GC – are shaped by similar factors and to a similar degree. 
 
ISO14001 and the GC in Comparative Perspective 
CR standards are non-state mandated regulatory institutions governing the behavior of 
firms (Cashore, 2002; Christopherson and Lillie, 2005; Hebb and Wójcik, 2005; Kollman 
and Prakash, 2002). Also termed voluntary codes, they operate at a number of spatial 
scales, and cover a multitude of issues (Angel et al., 2007; Nadvi, 2008). CR standards 
codify a set of rules, roles and expectations in areas of public concern – such as 
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environmental protection, labor rights, anti-corruption and reporting – not adequately 
addressed by public law. They signal that a company and/or its products and services are 
allied to certain “standards” of procedure, performance or commitment (Bansal and Hunter, 
2003; Christopherson and Lillie, 2005; Stringer, 2006). Standards allow firms to better 
comply with stakeholder demands, establish their credentials as good corporate citizens, 
and create competitively-valuable reputational assets. Moreover, they offer a means for 
lead firms to manage extra-economic aspects of international value chains, in that 
universally-applicable standards can be used as a basis for specifying, monitoring and 
verifying the CR of suppliers and subcontractors (Hughes et al., 2007; Nadvi, 2008). 
 Our particular concern in the present article is on two influential global standards 
addressing aspects of CR: ISO14001 and the GC. We chose these standards because they 
are leaders in their respective fields. ISO14001 is the most widely-adopted standard 
specifically addressing aspects of corporate environmental management, while the GC is 
the world’s foremost corporate citizenship initiative. At the same time, significant 
differences exist between the standards, both in their aims, procedural requirements and 
assurance mechanisms.  
Released in 1995, ISO14001 is a process-based environmental management system 
(EMS) developed and promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). Briefly, an EMS comprises a set of formalized and systematized procedures 
designed to help firms reduce their environmental impacts (Moon and deLeon, 2005). 
ISO14001 “standardizes” these procedures with the aim of providing a universally accepted 
framework for continually improving environmental performance that can be implemented 
worldwide. Organizations wishing to declare themselves ISO14001 certified must undergo 
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six steps: (1) create an environmental policy; (2) assess current environmental impacts, 
liabilities and legal compliance; (3) create an internal management system; (4) periodically 
audit and review environmental performance; (5) prepare a public statement declaring that 
ISO14001 is being implemented; and (6) employ a registered auditor to confirm that the 
organization’s procedures are consistent with the documented EMS (Neumayer and 
Perkins, 2004). This last verification stage is known as certification.  
The GC, released in 2000, is organized under the aegis of the United Nations (UN). 
Unlike ISO14001, the Compact does not prescribe formal procedures, but a set of ten 
generic principles which are intended to guide the practices of corporations. The principles, 
which derive from fundamental international treaties and declarations, cover four areas of 
business-society relations: human rights (principles 1-2); labor (3-6); environment (7-9); 
and anti-corruption (10). By encouraging firms to embed a set of universal, shared values 
into their strategy and operations, the Compact seeks to promote more responsible, 
inclusive forms of global corporate citizenship. In order to become a publicly-listed 
participant, a company’s chief executive officer needs to send a letter to the UN’s Secretary 
General, ‘expressing support for the Global Compact and its principles’ (UN, 2008a). 
Unlike ISO14001, however, compliance is not independently monitored, verified and 
assured by third-parties. Moreover, although participants are obliged to periodically submit 
a report detailing actions that they have taken to achieve the Compact’s goals, the UN does 
not monitor or measure the performance of participants.  
Of the two standards, ISO14001 has by far proved the most popular, even taking 
account of the fact that the standard was released earlier. As of the end of 2005, the last 
year of our sample, there were 1000 active firms in the GC. By comparison, at the 
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equivalent number of years after the introduction of ISO14001 (i.e. end of 2000), there 
were approximately 22,500 certified firms. Yet, as shown in figures 1 and 2 which 
respectively depict the domestic density of ISO14001 and the GC (i.e. country-level 
adoption counts normalized by population), these aggregate statistics mask significant 
variations across countries. Our central goal is to explain these variations which, we argue, 
are best understood as an example of geographically uneven diffusion.  
 
Conventional Approaches to Diffusion and their Shortcomings
Previous large-N, quantitative work concerned with the diffusion of organizational 
standards has sought to model spatio-temporal unevenness in terms of two sets of 
explanatory factors: external and internal (e.g. Guler et al., 2002). The former capture the 
influence of actors in other states whose adoption decisions, it is suggested, “spillover” 
across borders by directly or indirectly altering the optimal choices of domestic actors 
(Pitlik, 2007, 164). Internal determinants, on the other hand, refer to domestic, territorially-
bound attributes which accelerate or impede the domestic uptake of new innovations. 
Understanding diffusion in terms of external determinants, on the one hand, and internal 
determinants, on the other hand, is undoubtedly useful, drawing attention to two different 
aspects of “geography” that contribute to the uneven grounding of global standards 
amongst organizations located in particular territorial spaces. Yet, by failing to consider the 
ways in which domestic and extra-territorial influences might interact, previous studies into 
the diffusion of standards have potentially provided an unrealistic account of how 
geographic unevenness is produced. 
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Our point of departure in the present article is to argue that, as well as acting as 
independent determinants in their own right, internal and external influences are likely to 
combine. In particular, we anticipate the impact of external influences to be conditioned by 
certain domestic attributes, with the latter amplifying or attenuating the influence of the 
former. To take one example: the sale of goods to a country which has a high number of 
adoptions of ISO14001/GC may expose firms in the exporting country to new knowledge 
about the standard. Yet the extent to which domestic corporate managers respond to this 
information will plausibly depend on place-based, contextual factors which influence the 
local demand for CR or firms’ ability to supply this demand. The domestic context, in other 
words, is likely to define receptivity to transnational influences. 
Similar points have been made by scholars in other contexts (O'Loughlin et al., 
1998; Bridge, 2002). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to explore the 
conditioning role of domestic attributes on extra-territorial influences in the diffusion of 
organizational standards. In the next section, we explore the sources of external influences, 
focusing on transnational contact, communication and exchange.  
 
The Ties that Diffuse 
A core theme of the literature is that cross-national diffusion occurs where adoption in other 
countries stimulates domestic adoption. One stream of work identifies these “other” states 
as ones which are equivalent in terms of socio-cultural, political and/or economic 
characteristics (Albuquerque et al., 2007; Guler et al., 2002). Another set of explanations 
point to countries where the innovation in question has, or appears to have, proved 
successful (Pitlik, 2007; Simmons and Elkins, 2004). A third set of explanations emphasize 
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various forms of transnational contact, communication and exchange (Mosley and Uno, 
2007; Potoski and Prakash, 2004). 
We focus on this third category because we believe the theoretical arguments 
supporting the influence of transnationally linked countries are stronger than for other 
“reference” category accounts. Additionally, the role of certain boundary-spanning 
connectivities in accelerating the domestic uptake of standards has previously been 
demonstrated in a number of large-N, quantitative studies (Albuquerque et al., 2007; 
Neumayer and Perkins, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006, 2007).  
Following Simmons and Elkins (2004), we point to two mechanisms through which 
transnational contact, communication and exchange with other countries might plausibly 
give rise to cross-border spillovers: altered payoffs and information. Altered payoffs are 
hypothesized to arise where uptake of an innovation by actors in country A increases its 
relative profitability to potential adopters in country B. Altered payoffs may be financial, 
with adoption in other countries increasing the commercial value of a particular standard, or 
reducing the financial costs of implementation (Bennie et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2001). 
Altered payoffs may also be reputational, and bound-up with corporate actors’ quest for 
“legitimacy” amongst important stakeholders, with uptake in other countries helping to 
domestically institutionalize particular standards as “best” or “appropriate” practice (Guler 
et al., 2002; Mendel, 2002). 
A second mechanism implicated in cross-national spillovers by Simmons and 
Elkins (2004) is new information. Transnational contact, communication and exchange 
with adopters may increase cross-national learning about the existence, profitability and 
practical feasibility of CR standards. On the supply-side, such learning may provide ideas 
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about how standards can help to address existing management challenges. On the demand-
side, transnational learning may impart new information, ideas and templates about existing 
approaches to corporate social and environmental responsibility adopted elsewhere, 
potentially altering stakeholder expectations, demands and norms of appropriateness.  
Whether through one or (more likely) both of these mechanisms, we suggest that the 
degree to which adoption in one country spills-over into another country will depend on 
two factors. One is the density of foreign adopters (Perkins and Neumayer, 2004; Prakash 
and Potoski, 2007). Linkages to countries with a comparatively high number of ISO14001 
certificates or GC participants per capita are more likely to increase the payoffs from 
adoption or expand the availability of relevant information. Another salient determinant is 
the degree of transnational interdependence in terms of the level of boundary-spanning ties 
(Guler et al., 2002; Neumayer and Perkins, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006). Domestic 
actors are more likely to be influenced to implement a standard by adopters in other 
countries where they interact, communicate and exchange with them more.  
 
Trade 
Previous studies have ascribed a central role for exports in the domestic uptake of global 
CR standards arising from a “trading-up” effect (Vogel, 1997). According to this line of 
argument, exports may lead to a ratcheting-up of regulatory standards, so long as a 
country’s important trading partners have stringent environmental policies (Prakash and 
Potoski, 2006).  
Trading-up dynamics are typically theorized in terms of altered payoffs. Hence it is 
suggested that firms exporting to countries with a high number of adopters of CR standards 
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will face heightened economic incentives to follow suit by adopting similar standards. Most 
commonly these incentives are portrayed as emanating from the purchasing preferences or 
requirements of foreign buyers for their suppliers to adopt standards similar to those widely 
implemented in their own country (Coe and Wrigley, 2007; Mendel, 2002; Nadvi, 2008; 
Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Stringer, 2006). Yet high levels of uptake in important export 
markets might also drive domestic adoption by changing domestic expectations of 
profitability with domestic firms taking cues regarding their technical or economic 
properties from companies in key exports markets (Kollman and Prakash, 2002). Indeed, 
growing levels of uptake in export markets might set in motion a competitive bandwagon, 
as firms adopt out of fear that their foreign counterparts will otherwise gain a competitive 
advantage (O’Neill et al., 1998).  
Implicit in the above is the idea that export ties create boundary-spanning 
communication networks which act as conduits for the spread of new information. Via 
these network ties, firms may learn about the range of organizations which have 
implemented a particular standard in export markets, together with its relative popularity. 
They may also gain new understanding about the commercial benefits of standards, e.g. via 
easily-codified “success stories” of companies in export markets which have profitably 
implemented ISO14001 or the GC.  
 
Foreign direct investment  
While discussions of upwards convergence have typically focused on trade, recent work 
has switched attention to inward FDI and the potential for “investing-up” (Prakash and 
Potoski, 2007). Through outward FDI, TNCs can directly “export” standards to host 
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economies, implementing voluntary CR standards in their foreign affiliates and subsidiaries 
(Bridge, 2002; Garcia-Johnson, 2000). Amongst the reasons why TNCs might choose to 
deploy an internationally-recognized standard throughout their geographically dispersed 
network of operations are: to meet local and extra-local stakeholder expectations (Angel et 
al., 2007; Bansal and Hunter, 2003); to create competitively-valuable “organizational 
legitimacy” in host economies (Coe and Wrigley, 2007), providing firms with a “social 
license to operate and expand”; and to save on transaction costs associated with operating 
different self-regulatory practices in different countries (Angel et al., 2007).  
The presence of foreign affiliates and subsidiaries in the host economy may also be 
instrumental in changing domestic payoffs. Within this capacity, TNCs may use local firms 
which have adopted a familiar standard as preferred suppliers, or refuse to procure from 
those which have not (Jeppesen and Hansen, 2004). Foreign affiliates and subsidiaries 
could also trigger adoption through mimetic effects, as domestic firms “copy” specific CR 
standards believed to grant foreign transnationals a competitive advantage. Such dynamics, 
whereby firms competitively emulate rivals in the host economy, have been documented in 
other contexts (Coe and Wrigley, 2007).Likewise, domestic firms may imitate TNCs for 
reputational reasons, adopting a particular standard in order to align themselves with the 
progressive management practices of their high-reputation foreign counterparts. 
TNCs can also diffuse new information which, directly or indirectly, stimulates 
adoption of a particular standard by domestic firms. Through the local presence of 
transnationals who are adopters, domestic firms may not only learn about the existence of 
ISO14001 or the GC, but also their benefits. Equally significant, TNCs may help to 
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redefine the expectations of firms amongst civil society, demonstrating the availability, 
operation and outcomes of CR standards (Garcia-Johnson, 2000; Perkins, 2007).  
 
Business travel 
Although largely neglected in recent work into the diffusion of voluntary CR standards, it is 
our contention that international flows of businesspeople from countries where there is a 
high density of a particular CR standard may have a “visiting-up” effect, fostering higher 
levels of domestic uptake. First and foremost, this is likely to derive from the role of 
travelers as cross-border carriers of new information (Bunnell and Coe, 2001; Currah and 
Wrigley, 2004). In their meetings, conversations and dealings, foreign business visitors 
may well convey information about the existence, uses and wider commercial benefits of 
particular standards (Bryson, 2000). Received through direct, interpersonal contact, such 
information is likely to carry more credibility, and therefore have greater influence than 
distanciated forms of communication. Through face-to-face interactions – which are known 
to be important in diffusing “cultural” and “behavioral” norms across geographic borders 
(Jones, 2007, 241) – businesspeople may also be instrumental in socializing domestic 
managers into CR as best practice, and part-and-parcel of the legitimate responsibility of 
modern, progressive business organizations (Mendel, 2002). More generally, the mobility 
of businesspeople across national borders may help to transfer information, including tacit 
knowledge developed through prior experience with standards in other countries (Bryson, 
2000; Gertler 2003). Such knowledge could well accelerate domestic uptake by lowering 
the associated information and implementation costs of a particular standard. 
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 Inevitably, business travel will be functionally bound-up with both exports and 
inwards FDI, both of which frequently depend on the movement of people across national 
borders. However, geographic patterns of business travel are unlikely to be identical to 
those of trade and investment, such that it cannot be treated as a catch-all measure of the 
geometry and intensity of these linkages combined. Thus, the amount of business travel 
associated with trade and investment is likely to vary across countries, while certain forms 
of business travel (e.g. business association conference travel, visits to trade fairs) may only 
be partly related, or even entirely unrelated, to trade and FDI. Hence we believe that it 
makes sense to analyze business travel as a variable in its own right in the present article. 
 
The Conditioning Context  
In the present article, we focus on two domestic, contextual factors, GDP per capita and 
democracy, which we model as interacting with the transnational link-weighted spatial lags. 
Wealth and democracy are broad-based attributes, whose influence operates through a 
number of different channels which, theoretically, conceptually and empirically, have been 
implicated in shaping (uneven) patterns of standard adoptions. They are also two variables 
at the heart of social science research, respectively comprising foundational economic and 
political attributes identified as influencing a wide range of domestic differences.  
 
Economic wealth 
Wealth is likely to impact domestic actors’ receptivity to transnational influences by 
increasing domestic demand for many of the same issues addressed by CR standards. For 
many economists, factors such as environmental quality, labor rights, and good governance 
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are “normal goods” (Fredriksson et al., 2007; Lederman, Loayza, and Soares, 2005). We 
would therefore logically expect demand for corporate environmental and social 
responsibility to rise with GDP per capita (p.c.). This demand could be specified in a 
number of different ways, but where civic stakeholders come to learn about a particular CR 
standard widely adopted in other countries, it makes sense that it could well take the form 
of pressure to adopt a similar standard. Likewise, firms could respond to demands for CR 
through various initiatives, including company-specific codes. Yet where domestic 
managers have learnt about codes such as ISO14001 or the GC (e.g. through contact with 
business travelers), or face other pressures to adopt (e.g. from lead buyers), they might be 
more inclined to turn to one of these internationally-recognized standards.  
More important still, wealth is likely to operate via supply-side effects. Planning, 
implementing and certifying ISO14001 is known to involve potentially significant 
financial, managerial and (sometimes) technological resources (Moon and deLeon, 2005). 
The costs associated with integrating the GC’s principles into business practice are 
similarly unlikely to be negligible. We therefore expect domestically-owned firms in less 
wealthy countries to be less responsive to transnational influences (Klooster, 2006; Perkins, 
2007). 
  
Democracy 
According to the literature, several features of democracies might be expected to support 
the demand for, and supply of, goods provided by CR codes (Alok, Neil, and Carl, 2004; 
Payne, 1995). They include the freer flow of information which mean that individuals are 
likely to be better informed about the nature, existence and solutions to social, political and 
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environmental “bads” (Lederman, Loayza, and Soares, 2005). Another is greater freedom 
of expression, with people living in democratic polities better able to give voice to their 
concerns, preferences and demands, together with the freedom to associate, assemble and 
organize. Citizens in democratic states also have the right to vote, directly or indirectly, 
creating incentives for vote-seeking politicians to respond to public demands.  
   Based on these observations, we surmise that contact with foreign adopters of 
standards is more likely to spillover into higher domestic adoptions in democratic polities 
than autocratic ones. For a start, preferences for progressive environmental, social and/or 
political practices should be stronger in democracies, increasing domestic receptivity to 
matching innovations. With greater awareness of corporate “misdeeds” in areas such as 
environmental degradation, corruption and working conditions, and how these affect their 
well-being, individuals are more likely to demand action to address these negatives. As 
with wealth, where a country is more strongly linked to states with a high number of 
adopters of a particular standard (e.g. the GC) , this demand for CR is more likely to be 
specified in terms of the same standard (i.e. the GC).  
Actors in democratic polities will also be better-placed to exercise demands for CR. 
Hence, compared to the situation in autocratic polities, citizens are far more likely to be 
able to exert pressure on firms to address their environmental and social aspects, e.g. via 
labor unions, environmental NGOs, etc. The threat or reality of such pressure will, in turn, 
raise the payoffs from adopting standards. A failure to respond to societal expectations 
potentially involves a number of negative consequences for firms. Anticipating these 
consequences, managers may seek to pre-empt civic activism, implementing measures 
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which address citizens’ concerns, including voluntary CR codes about which they have 
knowledge. 
 
Previous Work 
Although not strictly comparable with our particular approach, previous empirical work 
provides a number of parallel insights. Several large-N quantitative studies have shown that 
economies whose export partners have a comparatively high number of adopters of 
ISO14001 also have a higher domestic number of certified firms (Albuquerque et al., 2007; 
Potoski and Prakash, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006, 2007). The influence of FDI is more 
ambiguous. Prakash and Potoski (2006) find that inward FDI has a statistically insignificant 
effect on domestic ISO14001 counts, while Delmas and Montiel (2008) estimate a negative 
and statistically significant effect, although it is worth noting that both studies are based on 
geographically aggregated measures of total FDI inflows, not on a spatial lag variable. 
Indeed, using a spatial lag operationalization in their estimations, Prakash and Potoski 
(2007) find that certification count density weighted by FDI inflows from these countries 
has a positive and statistically significant influence on domestic ISO14001 certification 
counts. However, their source for FDI data has many gaps, which renders the validity of the 
FDI-weighted spatial lag questionable.1 At least within the quantitative literature, the 
influence of business travel on the cross-national diffusion of CR standards remains 
unexplored.  
 Turning to our hypothesized contextual variables, the existing literature provides 
mixed support for the role of GDP p.c. in influencing the adoption of standards, although 
none of these works has explored wealth as a conditioning variable. A number of large-N, 
                                                 
1 We have overcome this problem by purchasing more complete FDI data from UNCTAD. 
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quantitative studies show that GDP p.c. has a statistically discernable positive effect on the 
number of ISO14001 certifications (Neumayer and Perkins, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 
2007), but others find that its influence is sensitive to the inclusion of other variables and 
choice of statistical specification (Potoski and Prakash, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006). 
Yet quantitative research generally suggests that wealthier economies demonstrate greater 
policy commitment and/or actual performance with regards to a number of issues 
underlying ISO14001 and the GC, including: superior environmental commitment and 
several measures of environmental quality (but not all measures, nor across all income 
levels) (Dasgupta et al., 2001); a lower incidence of child labor (Shelburne, 2001); better 
core labor rights (Busse, 2004); and lower levels of corruption (Bohara, Mitchell, and 
Mittendorff, 2004). 
 Regarding polity, the existing literature provides very limited insights, at least to the 
direct question as to whether democracies are more receptive to CR standards. In a 
bivariate correlation, Bennie et al. (2007) finds that Forbes Global 2000 companies 
headquartered in full democracies are more likely to join the GC, but this result does not 
hold in their multivariate analysis. To the authors’ knowledge, no studies have previously 
investigated the influence of polity on the uptake of ISO14001, although previous work 
generally supports the idea that more democratic countries have a better record on many of 
the issues addressed by CR standards: superior environmental commitment (Neumayer, 
2004) and (possibly) environmental quality (Farzin and Bond, 2005); a lower incidence of 
child labor (Shelburne, 2001); better core labor standards (Neumayer and de Soysa, 2005); 
and lower levels of corruption (Bohara, Mitchell, and Mittendorff, 2004).  
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Method 
Dependent variables 
We run two separate sets of regressions – one for each of the CR standards. For the 
ISO14001 estimation, our dependent variable is the number of certified facilities at the 
national level, normalized by country population size (with data from ISO 2007). Along 
similar lines, the dependent variable for the GC estimation is the domestic number of 
“active” business participants, again normalized by population size (with data from UN 
2008b). The panels do not cover identical years. The ISO panel spans 1996-2000 and 
covers up to 151 countries, while the equivalent GC panel covers 2001-2005 with up to 149 
countries. The reasoning behind our choice of different sample periods is that the standards 
were released at different times. Moreover, as documented in the literature, the 
determinants of innovation diffusion may vary over different stages of diffusion (O’Neill et 
al., 1998; Rogers, 1995; Rosenkopf and Abrahamson, 1999). For consistency, we purposely 
focus on the early stages of diffusion for which data are available for both standards, and 
when transnational influences are likely to be most important. The panels cover a six-year 
period, of which we lose the first year due to the inclusion of the temporally LDV.2  
 
Main explanatory variables 
As noted above, all three transnational connectivity variables are measured as spatial lags, 
which comprise the weighted sum of the dependent variable in other countries. In our 
research design, the weights capture the level of linkages between one state and others via a 
particular type of cross-border linkage, while the dependent variable of interest is the 
                                                 
2 Although the temporal length of our panel is shorter than several other studies concerned with diffusion, it is 
well-suited to the GMM estimator deployed here, which is designed for temporally short, but cross-
sectionally wide panels. 
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density of standards in these countries. The spatial lag works by linking the density of 
ISO14001 certificates/GC participants in different countries – effectively allowing a given 
density of adoptions in one country to “spillover” to another one – through a weighting 
mechanism represented by a connectivity matrix. Formally, the spatial lag model is defined 
as follows: 
...iktit ikt
k
y ywρ ε= + +∑   . (1) 
The spatial lag ikt kt
k
yw∑  consists of two elements, namely an N T⋅  matrix of the 
dependent variable in all other units k, multiplied with an N N T⋅ ⋅  block-diagonal spatial 
weighting matrix iktω , which measures the relative connectivity between N number of units 
i and N number of units k in T number of time periods in the off-diagonal cells of the matrix 
(the diagonal of the matrix has values of zero as there i = k and units cannot spatially 
depend on themselves). The spatial autoregression parameter ρ  gives the impact of the 
spatial lag on the dependent variable. 
We analyze three distinct spatial lags, for which we use three different connectivity 
variables constructed as follows: (i) trade, measured as exports from country i to countries 
k, with data from UN (2007); (ii) foreign direct investment, measured as inward FDI stock 
of countries k in country i, with data from UNCTAD (2008);3 and (iii) business travel, 
measured as foreign business travelers from countries k visiting country i, with data from 
UNWTO (2007). All weighting matrices are row-standardized, i.e. the entries of each row 
sum to unity, which in effect means that we use trade shares, FDI shares and business 
traveler shares, rather than absolute levels of connectivity. Row-standardization of the 
                                                 
3 We use stock rather than flow data since the latter are notoriously volatile and provide a misleading 
indication of transnational linkages. 
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weighting matrices is typically undertaken to allow an easy interpretation of the estimated 
spatial lag coefficient as the degree of interdependence (Anselin, 2002).4
Turning to domestic contextual attributes, GDP p.c. is measured using data from 
World Bank (2007). The inclusion of GDP p.c. means that we do not seek to include a 
number of other income-dependent variables which have been identified in previous work 
into the cross-national diffusion of CR standards. These include the number of 
environmental treaties (Vastag, 2004), number of environmental NGOs (Neumayer and 
Perkins, 2004) and number of environmental law firms (Potoski and Prakash, 2004). We 
capture democracy using Marshall et al.’s (2006) widely-used polity2 indicator. Derived 
from expert judgments on aspects of institutionalized democracy and autocracy within a 
country, polity2 runs from -10 to 10, with -10 representing a totally authoritarian political 
system and 10 a full democracy. 
 
Control variables 
Two sets of control variable are included in each of our estimations. The first is a 
temporally lagged dependent variable (LDV), included to control for bandwagon effects 
(Rosenkopf and Abrahamson, 1999). Typically, these are explained by network-type 
externalities whereby the payoffs from adopting a particular standard rise with the number 
of domestic adopters, e.g. as more firms adopt ISO14001, so does its value as a legitimate, 
widely-accepted signal of environmental responsibility. Bandwagon dynamics may also 
arise from expanded information about particular standards that flow from a larger user 
base. The existence of these self-reinforcing dynamics at the domestic scale has been 
                                                 
4 Row-standardization also makes substantive sense since our primary interest is in the identity of the major 
trade, investment and business travel partners, and not the total exposure of countries to these influences. 
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demonstrated in previous large-N, quantitative studies (Corbett and Kirsch, 2001; Moon 
and deLeon, 2005; Perkins and Neumayer, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006, 2007),  
 We also specify controls to take account of the possibility that prior adoption of 
other voluntary standards might facilitate subsequent uptake. For our ISO14001 
estimations, we include a control variable capturing the domestic density of ISO9000 
certificates. ISO9000, the quality management system standard released by the ISO in 
1987, shares many similarities with ISO14001. Indeed, prior experience of ISO9000 is 
likely to lower the associated information and implementation costs of ISO14001, 
increasing uptake of the latter. Most likely this explains previous large-N, quantitative 
research showing a positive correlation between domestic uptake of ISO9000 and 
ISO14001 (Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Perkins and Neumayer, 2004). Following a similar 
logic, we include ISO14001 – released five years earlier than the Compact – as a control 
variable in our GC estimations. As outlined earlier, the two codes differ in several 
important areas, more so than is the case for the ISO standards. Yet prior experience of 
ISO14001 might plausibly reduce firms’ reluctance to implement other CR standards 
(Delmas and Montiel, 2008).  
We do not include any further controls in order to avoid over-fitting the empirical 
model. With a temporally LDV, country fixed effects, year-specific time dummies, spatial 
lags, two explanatory variables capturing fundamental aspects of the economic and political 
context, together with variables controlling for prior adoption of potentially complementary 
standards, the empirical model is already stringently specified. Any further control variable 
is likely to be either highly correlated with one or the other of the existing variables, 
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creating multicollinearity problems, or largely uncorrelated with the existing variables, in 
which case its omission would not bias the estimations. 
 
Challenges of modeling cross-national diffusion 
The advantage of using spatial lags in the present context – as opposed to geographically 
aggregated measures of connectivity, e.g. total exports – is that they capture valuable 
geographic information about the degree to which countries are exposed to adopters in 
specific other countries. However, analysts run the risk of attributing the spread of similar 
innovations across different countries to transnational interdependencies when, in fact, they 
are independent and driven by common contextual factors across countries (Simmons and 
Elkins, 2004). We are keenly aware of this potential pitfall. And although we cannot rule 
out estimating spurious cross-national diffusion effects altogether, we nevertheless seek to 
minimize this risk in a number of ways.   
 First, we include country-specific fixed effects to control for unobserved country-
specific differences which might be correlated with our explanatory variables, including the 
spatial lags. Fixed effects take out the between or cross-national variation in adoption levels 
across countries and estimates are exclusively based on the over-time variation in adoption 
within countries. They thus eliminate the effect of spatial clustering in adoption levels 
arising from the presence of similar contextual attributes, such as similar socio-cultural 
factors, political systems or economic status in countries (Plümper and Neumayer, 2010). 
Spatial clustering in changes in adoption may still create problems in the estimation 
of our spatial lag variables. However, we believe that our measures of transnational 
interdependence (exports, FDI and business travel) are theoretically superior to rather 
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atheoretical measures of spatial clustering such as contiguity, geographical distance or same 
region. Our measures actually specify a concrete diffusion mechanism via contact, 
communication and exchange, whereas these other measures of spatial clustering do not.  
A second way in which we seek to minimize the risk of attributing spurious 
diffusion is that we use year-specific fixed effects to control for common trends and shocks 
which affect all countries equally, e.g. growing worldwide awareness about a particular 
voluntary standard over the period of our analysis. Third, we control for temporal dynamics 
by including the temporally LDV. A failure to control for common trends and shocks as 
well as temporal dynamics is likely to lead to biased estimates and potentially erroneous 
conclusions regarding the influence of transnational interdependencies (Plümper and 
Neumayer, 2010).  
The estimation of our model is rendered difficult by the endogeneity of the spatial 
lags and by what is known as Nickell (1981) bias arising from the inclusion of the 
temporally LDV. In order to deal with both problems, we estimate the model using 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. 
This widely-used estimator for dynamic panel data models corrects for Nickell bias by 
instrumenting the temporally LDV with further lags and also has the advantage that the 
spatial lag variables can be explicitly specified as endogenous, i.e. their past and 
contemporaneous values are allowed to be correlated with the error terms, and they are 
instrumented with further lags similar to the temporally LDV.  
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Results 
Table 1  provides results for ISO14001.5 Columns 1 to 3 show estimation results when each 
of the spatial lag variables are entered separately and without interaction effects, whereas 
columns 4 to 6 report results for each of the lags interacted with democracy and GDP p.c. 
Concentrating first on columns 1 to 3, the estimations confirm our a priori expectations in 
that all of the spatial lag variables are statistically significantly positive. Thus, we find that 
a higher density of ISO14001 adopters in other countries to which a particular state exports 
comparatively more, from which it has a relatively larger stock of FDI, and from which 
more business travelers visit spills-over into higher domestic densities of certificates. How 
important is each diffusion channel relative to the others? Unfortunately, because of the 
high level of collinearity amongst the spatial lag variables, they cannot be usefully entered 
together into the estimations. However, through our use of row-standardization, we can 
evaluate the relative strength of spatial dependence by comparing the estimated coefficients 
of the spatial lag variables. It seems that the degree of interdependencies through exports 
and business travel linkages are strongest, whereas interdependence through inward FDI 
linkages is only half as strong. 
As expected, the coefficient of the temporally LDV is positive and statistically 
significant, lending support to the idea that adoption is self-reinforcing.6 ISO9000 adoption 
has a positive effect on ISO14001 uptake which, as per previous studies (Delmas and 
Montiel, 2008; Perkins and Neumayer, 2004), indicates that the two standards are 
                                                 
5 The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator depends on the assumption of no second order autocorrelation. The 
reported test results suggest that for all estimations we cannot reject this assumption at conventional levels of 
statistical significance. 
6 Together, the sum of the coefficients of the temporal and spatial lags in columns 1 to 3 are implausibly high, 
representing at face value a non-stationary process. Yet the coefficients of the temporal lags decrease 
significantly once the spatial lag variables are interacted. Also, estimating the models for a longer time period 
(up to 2005 in the case of ISO14001) leads to much lower coefficients for the temporal lags, which are no 
longer implausibly high. 
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potentially complements. As can be seen by their statistically insignificant coefficients, 
neither democracy nor GDP p.c. have an unconditional effect on domestic ISO14001 
certification density. 
Yet, we do find that with the exception of business travel (for which the interaction 
effect is not far off statistical significance), all the interaction effects between the spatial lag 
variables and GDP p.c. are statistically significantly positive (see columns 4-6). Spatial 
interdependence through transnational linkages, in other words, is stronger in wealthier 
economies. Interestingly, however, none of the interactions between the spatial lags and 
democracy are statistically significant. Note, with interacted variables, the coefficients of 
the constituent terms on their own no longer have the same meaning as in non-interacted 
models. The insignificant coefficients of the spatial lag variables, which constitute one part 
of the interaction term, do not imply the absence of spatial dependence. Rather, they 
indicate the absence of spatial dependence only for observations in which GDP p.c. is equal 
to zero or extremely low. All that matters are the coefficients of the interaction effect which 
suggest that as incomes grow the effect of spatial dependence becomes increasingly 
positive. 
 We now examine our estimation results for the GC (table 2). Entered on their own, 
all of the spatial lag variables are significantly positive. Interdependence through export 
linkages is strongest, almost three times as strong as the interdependence through other 
linkages. The interaction effects are strikingly different compared to the estimations for 
ISO14001. With one exception (business travel), GDP p.c. has no significant conditioning 
impact on the spatial lag variables. However, whereas democracy was irrelevant for 
ISO14001, it has a statistically significantly positive effect on the impact of all spatial lags 
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for the GC, implying that spatial interdependence through transnational linkages has a 
greater influence in more democratic countries. Apart from the temporally LDV, none of 
the other explanatory variables has a consistent effect on GC uptake. Unlike 
ISO9000/ISO14001, ISO14001 and the GC do not seem to be complementary. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Within the context of economic globalization, heightened stakeholder expectations and a 
shift towards market environmentalism, global CR standards have emerged as increasingly 
important regulatory institutions governing aspects of corporate environmental and social 
responsibility (Cashore, 2002; Hebb and Wójcik, 2005; Klooster, 2006; Neumayer and 
Perkins, 2004; Potoski and Prakash, 2004). Our goal in the present article has been to 
provide fresh insight into how aspects of geography have underpinned spatio-temporal 
variations in the early diffusion of two leading standards. Unique to the field of quantitative 
study, we integrate interdependencies working through transnational linkages and territorial 
spaces into explanations of (uneven) cross-national diffusion, modeling the latter as 
exerting a conditioning influence on the former. The statistical findings support our 
arguments about the role of internal, contextual factors in shaping countries’ receptivity to 
external, transnational influences. Yet, interestingly, we find a clear difference between the 
two standards in the domestic factors which exert a conditioning influence. In the case of 
ISO14001, the strength of spatial interdependence through transnational linkages is greater 
in wealthier economies, but domestic levels of democracy appear to make no difference. 
Precisely the opposite holds for the domestic uptake of the GC. The strength of spatial 
interdependence through transnational linkages on domestic GC participation is higher in 
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more democratic countries while wealth only has a statistically discernable conditioning 
effect on interdependencies via business travelers. 
These differences between ISO14001 and the GC are, on the face of it at least, 
surprising. Yet it is quite possible that they reflect the very different nature of the respective 
standards. The idea that democracy should be more likely to have a conditioning influence 
on domestic receptivity to transnational forces in the case of the GC is therefore plausible. 
ISO14001’s close association with ISO9000, its emphasis on internal (“win-win”) cost 
savings, and potential differentiation advantage in terms of securing access to 
environmentally-demanding export markets, has meant that the standard has long held a 
degree of commercial appeal for profit-seeking businesses. As evidenced by its lower 
uptake, however, the “business” case for the GC has been far less obvious. In the absence 
of commercial benefits such as improved foreign market access, uptake of the Global 
Compact is likely to have been more dependent on pressure from domestic stakeholders. 
This is likely to have increased the conditioning influence of democracy in that effective 
demand from local stakeholders for the GC more strongly depends on the level of 
democratic freedoms. Indeed, whereas the GC addresses many issues (labor rights, human 
rights and corruption) which are characteristically suppressed in less democratic countries, 
the managerial, environmental aspects addressed by ISO14001 are unlikely to prove 
especially controversial to autocratic governments. These differences may also explain the 
particular significance of wealth in conditioning spatial interdependence via transnational 
linkages in the case of ISO14001. With levels of domestic demand less of a critical limiting 
factor, as in the case of the GC, uptake of ISO14001 is more likely to have been 
constrained by internal resources. Although firms in low-income countries may have 
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anticipated payoffs from adopting ISO14001, limited domestic resources means they are 
unlikely to have been able to do so, with the result that diffusion is conditioned by domestic 
GDP p.c.7  
Another contribution of the present article was to re-examine and, moreover, extend 
current understanding regarding the role of transnational linkages in diffusing CR standards 
across national borders. Our findings for ISO14001 confirm several previous studies which 
similarly show a trading-up effect, but, furthermore demonstrate that the influence of export 
linkages in increasing domestic certification is greater in wealthier countries (Albuquerque 
et al., 2007; Neumayer and Perkins, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006). Uniquely, and 
indicating that trading-up dynamics are not restricted to ISO14001, we also demonstrate 
that if a country mainly exports to markets characterized by a high density of participants 
this is associated with higher domestic participation in the GC. Our result for ISO14001 is 
far from surprising: evidence reveals that a key motive for certification of this “business” 
standard has been anticipated or real demand from customers in major export markets 
(Bansal and Hunter, 2003; Kollman and Prakash, 2002; Wu, Chu, and Liu, 2007). 
However, there is little case-study evidence that similar supply-chain pressures are 
exercised by lead firms in relation to the GC, suggesting that the influence of exports may 
also be through non-coercive dynamics such as expanded information. Regardless of the 
underlying drivers, the fact that trade emerges as the most influential form of transboundary 
connection-cum-flow lends strong support to arguments about the role of major exchange 
partners in fostering cross-border convergence (Clark et al., 2001; Prakash and Potoski, 
2006; Vogel, 1997).  
                                                 
7 It is also possible that the difference between ISO14001 and the GC may reflect differences in the sectoral 
distribution of adopters of the respective standard although, in the absence of comparative data, we cannot say 
anything definitive on this point. 
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Investing-up dynamics are also apparent although, of note, the impact of spatial 
interdependence through FDI on domestic uptake is estimated to be substantially lower than 
for export linkages. Hence, consistent with work on FDI-related spillovers (Jordaan, 2008), 
we find that if the main foreign countries with FDI stocks in the domestic country have a 
high density of ISO14001 certificates, this translates into higher domestic densities of 
certification. This result confirms similar findings by Prakash and Potoski (2007), but 
advances on this study by deriving from a larger sample and by being based on a more 
complete dataset of bilateral inward FDI stocks. We also provide evidence – for the first 
time – of a similar investing-up effect in the case of the GC.  
Novel to the quantitative literature, we additionally find evidence of “visiting-up” 
effects. A higher density of ISO14001 certificates and GC participants in foreign countries 
whose businesspeople visit is associated with higher domestic densities of the respective 
standard in receiving countries. Of course, it is possible that our business travel 
connectivity variable is simply capturing a broader set of influences related to trade and 
FDI. Still, our study provides the first large-N, statistical evidence supporting case-study 
literature which has documented a role for business travel in diffusing new knowledge, 
organizational practices and norms across territorial boundaries (Beaverstock, 2002; Jones, 
2007).  
We finish by briefly discussing a couple of wider implications. First, our study’s 
findings highlight the need for diffusion researchers to rethink their approach to modeling 
cross-national diffusion. Although it might be heuristically useful to draw a distinction 
between internal and external determinants, our study suggests that it may not always make 
sense to treat them as functionally independent. Under certain conditions, the territorially-
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bounded, contextual attributes of place may be instrumental in amplifying or attenuating 
the influence of transnational flows of information, norms and competitive pressures. 
Accordingly, we suggest that there is a need for researchers to explore integrating certain 
domestic, contextual and transnational, relational aspects in their models of cross-national 
diffusion. 
A second implication of our study is that it is wrong to assume that the cross-
national diffusion of different standards is governed by identical geographic factors. 
Certainly, the influence of boundary-spanning links is very similar in both cases, but our 
findings also reveal differences in the role of domestic, contextual factors in influencing 
countries’ receptivity to transnational interdependencies. Different aspects of place, in other 
words, appear to be important for standards with different goals, modalities and 
mechanisms.
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Figure 1. Density of ISO14001 adoptions, 2000 
Notes: Darker shades depict a higher number of ISO14001 certificates per capita.  
Source: Authors based on data from ISO (2007) 
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Figure 2. Density of Global Compact (GC) participants, 2005 
Notes: Darker shades depict a higher number of GC participants per capita 
Source: Authors based on data from UN (2008b) 
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Table 1. Estimation results for ISO14001. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISO14001 p.c. (t-1) 0.944 0.968 0.901 0.728 0.840 0.766 
 (9.63)*** (8.48)*** (9.84)*** (5.04)*** (5.54)*** (5.82)*** 
Spatial lag (export link) 0.318   -0.005   
 (2.16)**   (0.05)  
Spatial lag (FDI link)  0.141   -0.025  
  (2.74)***   (0.48) 
Spatial lag (business    0.318   0.025 
   travel link)   (1.89)*   (0.49) 
Spatial lag * democracy    0.006 0.007 0.005 
    (1.26) (1.64) (0.85)
Spatial lag * GDP p.c.    0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (2.80)*** (2.25)** (1.54)
Democracy -0.028 0.001 -0.038 -0.029 -0.053 -0.056 
 (1.48) (0.03) (1.32) (0.95) (1.36) (1.18) 
GDP p.c. 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.31) (1.26) (0.75) (0.26) (0.30) (0.23) 
ISO9000 p.c. 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 
 (2.47)** (2.22)** (2.26)** (2.67)*** (2.12)** (2.67)*** 
Test no second order 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
1.42 
(0.1542) 
1.39  
(0.1645) 
1.45  
(0.1477) 
1.59  
(0.1108) 
1.52  
(0.1279) 
1.47  
(0.1415) 
Obs. 599 555 547 599 555 547 
Countries 151 142 138 151 142 138 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Notes: Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator. All spatial lag variables as well as 
their interactions are modelled as endogenous. Coefficients of year-specific time dummy 
variables and constant not reported. Absolute z-statistics derived from robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Estimation results for the GC. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GC p.c. (t-1) 0.563 0.566 0.552 0.525 0.450 0.324 
 (5.35)*** (8.00)*** (9.28)*** (5.91)*** (6.97)*** (2.64)*** 
Spatial lag (export link) 0.878   0.366   
 (2.23)**   (1.19)   
Spatial lag (FDI link)  0.312   0.155  
  (2.12)**   (1.38) 
Spatial lag (business    0.305   -0.002 
   travel link)   (2.15)**   (0.02) 
Spatial lag * democracy    0.030 0.017 0.027 
    (1.66)* (1.80)* (1.76)* 
Spatial lag * GDP p.c.    0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (1.01) (0.70) (2.37)**
Democracy 0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.13) (0.86) (0.49) (1.41) (0.66) (1.07) 
GDP p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.05) (0.68) (1.49) (0.57) (0.46) (0.38) 
ISO14001 p.c. 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (1.32) (1.59) (1.94)* (0.55) (1.14) (0.71) 
Test no second order 
autocorrelation(p-value) 
0.33 
(0.7395) 
-0.15  
(0.8815) 
0.41  
(0.6846) 
0.09  
(0.9299) 
-0.01 
(0.9986) 
0.64  
(0.5245) 
Obs. 552 553 538 552 553 538 
Countries 142 148 137 142 148 137 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator. All spatial lag variables as well as 
their interactions are modelled as endogenous. Coefficients of year-specific time dummy 
variables and constant not reported. Absolute z-statistics derived from robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
 43
